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This is an introduction to the special issue titled “Collec-
tive behavior and evolutionary games” that is in the making
at Chaos, Solitons & Fractals. The term collective behavior
covers many different phenomena in nature and society. From
bird flocks and fish swarms to social movements and herding
effects [1–5], it is the lack of a central planner that makes the
spontaneous emergence of sometimes beautifully ordered and
seemingly meticulously designed behavior all the more sensa-
tional and intriguing. The goal of the special issue is to attract
submissions that identify unifying principles that describe the
essential aspects of collective behavior, and which thus allow
for a better interpretation and foster the understanding of the
complexity arising in such systems. As the title of the spe-
cial issue suggests, the later may come from the realm of evo-
lutionary games, but this is certainly not a necessity, neither
for this special issue, and certainly not in general. Interdisci-
plinary work on all aspects of collective behavior, regardless
of background and motivation, and including synchronization
[6–8] and human cognition [9], is very welcome.
1. Evolutionary games
Evolutionary games [10–15] are, nevertheless, particularly
likely to display some form of collective behavior, especially
when played on structured populations [16, 17], and hence
have been chosen to co-headline the special issue. Some back-
ground information and basic considerations follow.
Consider that players can choose either to cooperate or to
defect. Mutual cooperation yields the reward R to both play-
ers, mutual defection leads to punishment P of both players,
while the mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s pay-
off S and the defector the temptation T . Typically R = 1
and P = 0 are considered fixed, while the remaining two
payoffs can occupy −1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2. If
T > R > P > S we have the prisoner’s dilemma game,
while T > R > S > P yields the snowdrift game [18].
Without much loss of generality, this parametrization is of-
ten further simplified for the prisoner’s dilemma game, so that
T = b is the only free parameter while R = 1 and P = S = 0
are left constant. However, since the condition P > S is no
longer fulfilled, this version is usually referred to as the weak
prisoner’s dilemma game. For the snowdrift game one can, in
a similar fashion, introduce r ∈ [0, 1] such that T = 1+ r and
S = 1− r, where r is the cost-to-benefit ratio and constitutes
a diagonal in the snowdrift quadrant of the T − S plane.
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In the prisoner’s dilemma game defectors dominate coop-
erators, so that in well-mixed populations natural selection
always favors the former. In the snowdrift game [19], on
the other hand, a coexistence of cooperators and defectors is
possible even under well-mixed conditions, and spatial struc-
ture may even hinder the evolution of cooperation [20]. The
prisoner’s dilemma is in fact the most stringent cooperative
dilemma, where for cooperation to arise a mechanism for the
evolution of cooperation is needed [21]. This leads us to the
year 1992, when Nowak and May [22] observed the sponta-
neous formation of cooperative clusters on a square lattice,
which enabled cooperators to survive in the presence of de-
fectors, even in the realm of the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The mechanism is now most frequently referred to as network
reciprocity or spatial reciprocity, and it became very popu-
lar in the wake of the progress made in network science and
related interdisciplinary fields of research [23–26]. The pop-
ularity was amplified further by the discovery that scale-free
networks provide a unifying framework for the evolution of
cooperation [27] – a finding that subsequently motivated re-
search on many different interaction networks [16], including
such that coevolve as the game evolves [28–32].
The prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game are exam-
ples of pairwise interaction games. At each instance of the
game, two players engage and receive payoffs based on their
strategies. However, there are also games that are governed
by group interactions, the most frequently studied of which is
the public goods game [33]. The basic setup with cooperators
and defectors as the two competing strategies on a lattice can
be described as follows [34]. Initially, N = L2 players are ar-
ranged into overlapping groups of size G such that everyone
is surrounded by its k = G − 1 neighbors and thus belongs
to g = G different groups, where L is the linear system size
and k the degree (or coordination number) of the lattice. Co-
operators contribute a fixed amount a, normally considered
being equal to 1 without loss of generality, to the common
pool while defectors contribute nothing. Finally, the sum of all
contributions in each group is multiplied by the synergy factor
r > 1 and the resulting public goods are distributed equally
amongst all the group members. Despite obvious similarities
with the prisoner’s dilemma game (note that a public goods
game in a group of size G corresponds to G− 1 pairwise pris-
oner’s dilemma interactions), the outcomes of the two game
types may differ significantly, especially in the details of col-
lective behavior emerging on structured populations [35].
2. Strategic complexity and more games
Significantly adding to the complexity of solutions are
additional competing strategies that complement the tradi-
2tional cooperators and defectors, such as loners or volunteers
[36, 37], players that reward or punish [38–48], or conditional
cooperators and punishers [49, 50], to name but a few recently
studied examples. These typically give rise to intricate phase
diagrams, where continuous and discontinuous phase transi-
tions delineate different stable solutions, ranging from single
and two-strategy stationary states to rock-paper-scissors type
cyclic dominance that can emerge in strikingly different ways.
Figure 1 features characteristic snapshots of four representa-
tive examples.
Besides traditionally studied pairwise social dilemmas,
such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game, and
the public goods game which is governed by group interac-
tions, many other games have recently been studied as well.
Examples include the related collective-risk social dilemmas
[51–54] and stag-hunt dilemmas [55], as well as the ultima-
tum game [56–65]. Depending on the setup, most notably
on whether the interactions among players are well-mixed or
structured [44, 45], but also on whether the strategy space
is discrete or continuous [57, 64, 65], these games exhibit
equally complex behavior, and they invite further research
along the lines outlined for the more traditionally studied evo-
lutionary games described above.
3. Simulations versus reality
Monte Carlo simulations are the predominant mode of anal-
ysis of evolutionary games on structured populations. Follow-
ing the distribution of competing strategies uniformly at ran-
dom, an elementary step entails randomly selecting a player
and one of its neighbors, calculating the payoffs of both play-
ers, and finally attempting strategy adoption. The later is ex-
ecuted depending on the payoff difference, along with some
uncertainty in the decision making to account for imperfect
information and errors in judging the opponent. The temper-
ature K in the Fermi function [66] is a popular choice to ad-
just the intensity of selection, and it is also frequently consid-
ered as a free parameter in determining the phase diagrams
of games governed by pairwise interactions [67] (note that for
games governed by group interactions the impact of K is qual-
itatively different and in fact less significant [34]). Repeating
the elementary step N times gives a chance once on average
to every player to update its strategy, and thus constitutes one
full Monte Carlo step.
Although simulations of games on structured populations
are still far ahead of empirical studies and economic experi-
ments [68], recent seminal advances based on large-scale hu-
man experiments suggest further efforts are needed to recon-
cile theory with reality [69–71]. According to the latter, net-
work reciprocity does not account for why we so often choose
socially responsible actions over defection, at least not in the
realm of the prisoner’s dilemma game. On the other hand,
there is also evidence in support of cooperative behavior in
human social networks [72, 73], as well as in support of the
fact that dynamic social networks do promote cooperation in
experiments with humans [74]. These findings, together with
the massive amount of theoretical work that has been pub-
lished in the past decades, promise exciting times ahead. Our
hope is that this special issue will successfully capture some
of this vibrancy and excitement, and in doing so hopefully rec-
ommend the journal to both readers and prospective authors.
4. Future research
In terms of advisable future directions for research, at least
in terms of evolutionary games, interdependent (or multiplex)
networks certainly deserve mentioning. Not only are our so-
cial interactions limited and thus best described by models en-
tailing networks rather than by well-mixed models, it is also
a fact that these networks are often interdependent. It has re-
cently been shown that even seemingly irrelevant changes in
one network can have catastrophic and very much unexpected
consequences in another network [78–82], and since the evo-
lution of cooperation in human societies also proceeds on such
interdependent networks, it is of significant interest to deter-
mine to what extent the interdependence influences the out-
come of evolutionary games. Existing works that have stud-
ied the evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks
concluded that the interdependence can be exploited success-
fully to promote cooperation [83–86], for example through
the means of interdependent network reciprocity [87] or in-
formation sharing [88], but also that too much interdepen-
dence is not good either. In particular, individual networks
must also be sufficiently independent to remain functional if
the evolution of cooperation in the other network goes terribly
wrong. Also of interest are evolutionary games on bipartite
networks [89, 90], where group structure is considered sepa-
rately from the network structure, and thus enables a deeper
understanding of the evolution of cooperation in games that
are governed by group interactions. It seems that the evolution
of cooperation on both interdependent and bipartite networks
has reached fruition to a degree that the next step might be to
consider coevolution between cooperation and either interde-
pendence or bipartiteness. Lastly we also refer to [91], where
Section 4 features 10 interesting open problems that certainly
merit attention.
Finally, we would like the potential authors to explore also
the challenging issue of a possible connection between soci-
ology and neurophysiology. In same cases [36] game theory,
which is widely applied in sociology, generates patterns rem-
iniscent of those produced by the Ising model thereby sug-
gesting a possible connection with criticality [92], which is
becoming an increasingly popular hypothesis in neurophys-
iology, especially for brain dynamics [93, 94], where this
assumption generates theoretical results yielding a surpris-
ingly good agreement with the experimental observation of
real brain [95]. The potential authors may also contribute
significant advances to understand the real nature of neuro-
physiological criticality, whose connections with the critical-
ity of physical systems are not yet satisfactorily established
[96], although criticality-induced dynamics are proven to be
responsible for a network evolution fitting the main subject
of this special issue as well as the crucial neurophysiological
hypothesis of Hebbian learning [97]. The decision making
3FIG. 1: Spatial patterns, emerging as a consequence of the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between the competing strategies. Top
left: Dynamically generated cyclic dominance in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game [75]. Light yellow (blue) are cooperators (defectors)
whose learning capacity is minimal, while dark yellow (dark blue) are cooperators (defectors) whose learning capacity is maximal. Top right:
Cyclic dominance in the spatial public goods game with pool-punishment [45]. Black, white and blue are defectors (D), pure cooperator (C)
and pool-punishers (O), respectively. Within the depicted (D+C+O)c phase, there are significantly different interfaces between the coexisting
phases, which give rise to the anomalous “survival of the weakest”. Pure cooperators behave as predators of pool-punishers, who in turn
keep defectors in check, who in turn predate on pure cooperators. Bottom left: Cyclic dominance in the spatial ultimatum game with discrete
strategies [65]. The dominance is not between three strategies, but rather between two strategies (E1 depicted blue and E2 depicted green) and
an alliance of two strategies (E2 + A, where A is depicted black). Although similarly complex phases have been reported before in spatial
ecological models [76] and in the spatial public goods game with pool punishment [45], the observation of qualitatively similar behavior in
the ultimatum game enforces the notion that such exotic solutions may be significantly more common than initially assumed, especially in
systems describing human behavior. Bottom right: Cyclical dominance between cooperators (white), defectors (black) and peer-punishers
(orange) in the hard peer-punishment limit [77]. If punishment is sufficiently expensive and taxing on the defectors, this reduces the income of
both defectors and peer-punishers. Along the interface, players can thus increase their payoff by choosing to cooperate, which manifests as the
formation of white “monolayers” separating defectors and peer-punishers. We refer to the original works for further details about the studied
evolutionary games.
4model [97], a dynamical model sharing [98] the same criti-
cality properties as those adopted to study the brain dynamics
[92], generates an interesting phenomenon that the authors in
[99] used to explain the Arab Spring events. This is a socio-
logical phenomenon, where a small number of individual pro-
duces substantial changes in social consensus [99], in agree-
ment with similar results based on the adoption of game the-
ory [100]. The theoretical reasons of this surprising agreement
is one of the problems that hopefully some contributors to this
special issue may solve. We hope that papers on this issue
may help to establish a connection between criticality [101]
and swarm intelligence [1] and hopefully between cognition
[9] and consciousness [102].
To conclude, we note that this special issue is also about
to feature future research. In order to avoid delays that are
sometimes associated with waiting for a special issue to be-
come complete before it is published, we have adopted an
alternative approach. The special issue will be updated con-
tinuously from the publication of this introduction onwards,
meaning that new papers will be published immediately after
acceptance. The issue will hopefully grow in size on a regular
basis, with the last papers being accepted no later than August
30th for the special issue to be closed by the end of 2013. The
down side of this approach is that we cannot feature the tra-
ditional brief summaries of each individual work that will be
published, but we hope that this is more than made up for by
the immediate availability of the latest research. Please stay
tuned, and consider contributing to “Collective behavior and
evolutionary games”.
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